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Wolinsky: Reflections of a Litigator

REFLECTIONS OF A LITIGATOR: SERRANO V.
PRIEST
GOALS AND STRATEGIES
Sid Wolinsky 1

It is a special privilege to be present at the beginning
of something significant. I was fortunate to be able to
head up the litigation team in Serrano, from the drafting
of the initial complaint in 1968 through the argument in
the California Supreme Court in Serrano III in 1977.
In this article, I intend to describe what we hoped to
achieve at that time and the strategies we used, and then
to circle back and offer some observations about what
we might learn from the litigation.
I.

THE BEGINNING

In 1968, I was a young attorney with a business
litigation firm in Beverly Hills. I also served as a
volunteer attorney at the Western Center on Law and
Poverty, a government funded program that had been
established just the year before. One sunny afternoon,
Derrick Bell, the director of the Center, asked me if I
might be interested in heading up a litigation effort to
1
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challenge the inequality of the public school financing
system in California. I was 31 years old, insufficiently
cautious, and clearly did not know what I was getting
into. What ensued was over a decade of intensive and
challenging litigation, including three separate
appearances before the California Supreme Court and
the longest trial of my 57-year professional life.
We assembled a small team of public interest
lawyers, as well as several law professors who had been
writing about the deficiencies of the school financing
system. Multiple discussions resulted in us formulating
three sequential objectives.
The first was to define and establish, for the first
time, the legal right to equal educational opportunity in
the public school system (in legal jargon, to establish a
cause of action). The second objective was to gather and
put on record overwhelming evidence about the school
financing system in California which would establish,
beyond any reasonable dispute, the wealth-based
inequity in educational opportunity. The final goal was
to provide a framework for a remedial and alternative
financing system to replace the existing structure.
If Mrs. Chambers, my sixth-grade teacher, were
still around, I am quite confident that she would have
given us an “A” on the first two objectives and probably
no more than a “C” on the last one. Pursuit of each of the
three objectives required multiple strategic and
procedural choices. Several of the most important of
these are described below.

II.

ESTABLISHING THE CAUSE OF
ACTION.

A. Developing the Theory
The legal team made the decision to focus on the
California court system (rather than the Federal system)
in its attempt to create the legal right to a more equitable
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school finance system. The seventeen-page complaint
was filed August 23, 1968, in Los Angeles County
Superior Court. It named John Serrano Jr., a psychiatric
social worker for the City of Los Angeles and the parent
of a child in the Baldwin Park school district, as the lead
plaintiff, along with the parents of twenty-six other Los
Angeles County school children. In formulating the legal
basis for the complaint, we relied heavily on the legal
theory that had been developed primarily by professors
Jack Coons and Steve Sugarman at Boalt Hall (now U.C.
Berkeley School of Law).
As expected, the trial court dismissed the
complaint. Plaintiffs appealed and the California
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the
plaintiffs had stated a cause of action. 5 Cal. 3d 584; 487
p. 2d 1241; 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). The Court reasoned
that under both the state and federal equal protection
clauses, education is a “fundamental interest,” and that
wealth-based discrimination is a “suspect classification.”
As such, the school financing system, resting heavily
upon the local property tax, could not survive a “strict
scrutiny” standard of review. Serrano I has been cited in
670 law review articles. The case was remanded to the
trial court to determine whether the substantial inequality
in a school district ability to tax and spend resulted in
inequality of educational opportunity.

III.

STEPS NOT TAKEN

To have a complete picture of this early phase of the
litigation, it is important to note what plaintiffs’ counsel
did not do, as well as the affirmative steps which we did
take. Plaintiffs’ lawyers did not file in federal court.
Plaintiffs did not move to certify the case as a class
action. We did not name the governor or the legislature
as defendants. We did not raise any issues concerning
discrimination of the finance system against racial
minority groups.
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Plausible arguments could be made for and against
each of these decisions. Taken together, however, the
choices do appear to have contributed to the ultimate
success of the case and to have kept it from being
bogging down in needless procedural bickering.
For example, a case of this complexity and magnitude
would usually be brought as a class action. However,
plaintiffs’ attorneys concluded that this was not
technically necessary in the Serrano litigation because
they had named Ivy Baker Priest, the Treasurer of
California as a defendant, thus giving the court
jurisdiction to mandate statewide relief. By not pursuing
the case as a class action, the plaintiffs’ lawyers saved an
estimated six months of time that would have been
required to brief and certify the class, not including a
possible appeal of the issue.
By not naming the governor or legislature as
defendants, we avoided the additional briefing,
complexity, and additional time required when further
parties are involved.
Perhaps the most significant strategy choice was the
decision to avoid federal court and to file in the
California court system. The decision was a fortunate
one, given the fact that the Serrano plaintiffs prevailed
in the California state court even though, in the very
similar case of San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, U.S. (1972), the United States Supreme
Court reached the opposite result.

IV.

ESTABLISHING THE FACTUAL
RECORD OF INEQUALITY

A. The Trial
Having determined that the plaintiffs had stated a
valid cause of action under the equal protection clause of
the California State Constitution, the California Supreme
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Court, in Serrano I, remanded the case to the state
Superior Court for trial of the facts. This included the key
question of whether substantial inequality in the ability
of school districts to levy taxes and to spend equaled
inequality of educational opportunity (sometimes
referred to as the “cost-quality” issue).
Preparation for the trial presented major challenges. The
case involved some 6,000,000 students in over 1,000
school districts. To complicate matters further, after the
California Supreme Court decision but before the trial,
the legislature had responded to Serrano I with
legislation known as SB 90.
SB 90, enacted in 1972, moved California in the
direction of greater educational financing equality,
allocating substantial additional funds to poor school
districts. For example, it raised the minimum level
(known as the “foundation level”) of spending in high
school districts from $488 to $750 per pupil in average
daily attendance. Similarly, the foundation level for
elementary school districts was almost doubled.
However, the basic structure of school finance that
existed before the Serrano I decision was not changed,
which led the trial court to ultimately determine that even
after implementation of SB 90, the California school
financing system could not meet California
constitutional standards.
Because plaintiffs’ counsel were concerned
about the complexity and size of the case, we made a
special request that an experienced judge be specially
assigned for the trial. Judge Bernard S. Jefferson was
given the assignment. Jefferson, a renowned legal
scholar, was an acknowledged master of the law of
evidence, and his book on the subject was used by
virtually every judge in the state.
Trial began on December 26, 1972. It consumed
60 days of trial over a period of six months, with multiple
briefings and arguments between trial days. Total
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briefings were hundreds of pages long and the trial
transcript was over 6,000 pages.
This was a formidable undertaking at a time when
there was no internet or cellular communication, no
computers, no faxes, no internet research, no high-speed
copiers, nor other technology which trial lawyers now
routinely rely upon.
B. The Evidence
Plaintiffs’ counsel elected to use several different
types of evidence. This primarily consisted of (1) purely
statistical and financial data, with heavy reliance on
comparisons between high-wealth and low-wealth
school districts in terms of both money spent and
educational outputs, (2) the testimony of school district
superintendents and other educators, and (3) the
testimony of researchers and other experts in education.
In an effort to bring the voluminous but dry statistical
data to life, we frequently focused on the comparison
between Baldwin Park and Beverly Hills school districts.
This provided a dramatic contrast, which the media,
politicians and the public could immediately grasp.
Driving from Baldwin Park west on the San
Bernardino Freeway to Beverly Hills only took twentyfive minutes, but in many respects the two communities
might as well have been on different planets. The public
perception of Beverly Hills was largely an accurate one;
it consisted of multi-million-dollar mansions surrounded
by manicured grounds, swimming pools, and multi-car
garages. This enviable tax base was augmented by the
banks, insurance companies, high end department stores,
and office buildings along Wilshire Boulevard and the
surrounding streets.
Nearby Baldwin Park presented a different picture –
drab one-story stucco homes interspersed with momand-pop grocery and liquor stores, gas stations, and
burrito stands. The result of this contrast was that with
two and one-half times as many students as Beverly

34
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byu_elj/vol2022/iss1/8

6

Wolinsky: Reflections of a Litigator

2]

Reflections of a Litigator

Hills, Baldwin Park had about $1 million less each year
to spend on education. The visual image of the oil wells
on the Beverly Hills High School grounds highlighted
the contrast.
A second type of evidence that we presented
consisted of the testimony of school superintendents and
other supervisorial personnel. These were selected from
both high-and-low wealth districts. These witnesses gave
detailed accounts their educational offerings as well as
their needs and resources. Trial lawyers for plaintiffs
would normally have hesitated to have put on
superintendents from school districts with a strong tax
base; they were predictably unsympathetic to plaintiffs’
objectives. However, wealthy districts had to argue that
they would be badly hurt in their educational offerings if
they had to cut back on spending. Thus, they were in
effect forced to be plaintiffs’ witnesses and to affirm the
relationship between spending and quality of educational
offering – the key question in the litigation.
C. Rebuttal Evidence
An additional category of witnesses presented by
plaintiffs at the trial were researchers and experts on
education generally and school financing particularly.
Plaintiffs made a strategic choice in presenting this social
science testimony. They decided not to put on this
evidence as part of their case-in-chief; instead, it was all
presented as a part of plaintiffs’ rebuttal case. This is not
an unusual tactic in a lengthy case. Pushing evidence
from the main case back to the rebuttal phase gives
plaintiffs a stronger “last word.” In Serrano, it served
additional and important strategic purposes. By making
this rebuttal testimony, plaintiffs intended to make the
point that defendants had the burden to establish that
higher spending did not equate with greater educational
opportunity. Plaintiffs also took pains to emphasize this
burden of proof argument in their reply briefing. The
burden of proof was especially critical in Serrano, as it
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is in almost all school financing cases, because it is
actually impossible to definitively establish the
spending/quality correlation.
Finally, rebuttal was used as an opportunity to
present evidence which responded to defendants’
argument that large sums of additional money had been
allocated by the SB 90 legislation. In a nutshell,
plaintiffs’ response was that plaintiffs were alleging
inequality of educational opportunity, not denial of an
“adequate” education.
D. Evidence on Remedy
Finally, the rebuttal phase of the case was also used
by plaintiffs to present most of their evidence concerning
a potential remedy. The most crucial tactic of plaintiffs,
with respect to the remedy, was to assiduously avoid
requesting that the court dictate how educational dollars
should be allocated. The original complaint did include
in its relief section a request for an order that the
legislature reallocate school funds to bring the state
within constitutional boundaries.
However, in the final round of briefing and
arguments, the plaintiffs’ attorneys were more modest in
their requests. They recognized that the court was
institutionally limited in its ability either to formulate the
remedy for such a complex and political problem or to
implement it effectively. We did present substantial
testimony and evidence describing a variety of possible
solutions to the educational inequality issue. However,
we presented them only to demonstrate to the court that
there were multiple ways in which the defendants could
comply with an appropriate order, but not to argue that
the court should dictate which remedial steps ultimately
should be implemented.
The range of possible remedial systems which
plaintiffs presented included “power equalizing.” This
was a plan proposed by Professors Coons and Sugarman.
Under their system, school districts choosing the same
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tax rate would spend at the same level. Other remedial
proposals presented to the court included a plan under
which the state would take over all property taxation and
distribute proceeds to school districts in direct proportion
to enrollment.
E. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
As the trial neared its conclusion, we requested,
and were granted, permission to draft proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Although this was not an
unusual procedure, in this case it was of great
importance. Having anticipated the court’s affirmative
response to the request, plaintiffs’ attorneys started to
draft proposed findings starting from the earliest days of
the trial. Plaintiffs ultimately expended hundreds of
hours in drafting the proposed findings and conclusions.
These served multiple functions and the time was well
spent.
Drafting the findings as the trial was in progress
enabled us to tailor the evidence presented to our factual
and legal arguments as we went along. Conversely, it
enabled us to fine-tune the drafts of the findings and
conclusions to closely mesh with the actual evidence
presented.
When the trial ended, the findings and
conclusions became an advocacy mechanism in their
own right. They served as a review of all of plaintiffs’
evidence – a review which was both extremely
comprehensive and very detailed.
After the trial ended, the court adopted 357
findings of fact and conclusions of law. In doing so,
Judge Jefferson found for plaintiffs on every important
issue. These findings and conclusions, coupled with the
106-page opinion of the court filed in April 1974 and the
lengthy trial record, made it extremely difficult for the
defendants to attack the court’s determinations on
appeal.
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In Serrano II, the California Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court’s decision, 18 Cal. 3d 728 (1976). The
Supreme Court’s actions included approval of both the
timetable for relief set by the trial court and the trial court
determination that the legislature’s action in passing SB
90 was not sufficient to meet California constitutional
standards.

V.

LESSONS LEARNED

What lessons might be learned from this lengthy and
significant litigation? Several aspects of the case stand
out as particularly noteworthy, for school financing
litigation and for public interest advocacy in general.
First, Serrano serves as an excellent example of the
importance and power of impact litigation as well as its
limitations in trying to bring about social change. It is
highly unlikely that substantial reform of school
financing in California would have taken place without
the litigation. On the other hand, given the institutional
limits of the judicial system in fashioning or
implementing an actual remedy for as complex an issue
as school financing, the litigation alone was not
sufficient. Only the sustained involvement and activism
of educators, political figures, experts, academicians,
and community groups, along with the litigation, made
actual reform possible.
Second, teamwork counts. Serrano was, at every
stage, a group effort. Every procedural step, every
argument, every strategy, and every tactical move was
discussed and debated at length with input sought out
from multiple disciplines and viewpoints. For example,
the extraordinary contribution to the litigation of
academicians, including the brilliant work of professors
Coons, Sugarman, and Horowitz, stands as a model of
collaboration between academicians and legal
practitioners.
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Third, every detail counted. In a case like this,
there is no such thing as overdoing the amount of work
or attention or time spent. Now, years later, it is easy to
forget that the case might well have been lost and that the
successful California Supreme Court decision was
decided by a 4 to 3 vote.
Fourth, success in a school financing case like Serrano
requires a sustained effort over a substantial period of
time. Those who covet instant gratification in their work
should look elsewhere.
Finally, it is important to note the necessity for
institutional support. Idealism, good intentions, and
theory can go a long way to bring about change, but cases
like this require a substantial commitment of funds,
personnel, and other resources, often over many years.
In the case of Serrano, the nonprofit law firm of Public
Advocates, Inc. filled that role. The firm not only paid
for all the expenses of the trial and the appeals, but
expended many hundreds of hours of attorney, paralegal,
and administrative support time in the effort. This was
done with no assurance of ever recovering any of the
expenditures or being compensated for the time spent.
This was a very serious risk for Public Advocates, which
had only started in 1971. In Serrano III, 20 Cal.3d 25; 41
Cal.Rptr. 315; 569 P.2d 1303 (1977), which has been
cited in 1,088 cases and 122 law reviews, the California
Supreme Court, in addition to affirming the trial court’s
response to Serrano II (including the six-year timetable
for compliance), affirmed an attorney fee award of
$800,000 under the equitable “private attorney general”
theory of fee-shifting. This concluded, on a distinctly
happy note, my decade-long involvement with this
significant litigation.
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